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Social representations are produced and reproduced through social interactions. 
Gerard Duveen made an important contribution by revealing the subtle processes 
through which the microgenetic production of knowledge is constrained by the 
identity relations between the participants in an interaction. Relations of symmetry and 
asymmetry constrain what can be said and heard. In this paper, we show how these 
ideas yield fruitful analyses in the context of two research projects. First, in a project 
concerning professional advice-giving by Health Visitors to parents, we elucidate the 
identity stakes involved in offering, receiving and resisting advice. Giving advice is 
not simply presenting new knowledge, it re-positions the advice-giver and advice-
receiver with complex consequences for each person’s knowledge and action. Second, 
in an experimental study of communication conflict we show how hierarchical identity 
positions constrain what can be both said and heard. Across both studies, we draw 
attention to the processes allowing speaking and listening on the one hand, or self-
silencing and dismissing on the other. To take this line of inquiry further, we conclude 
by suggesting directions for future research, calling for investigations of how specific 
identity content and identity relations mediate knowledge construction, and for studies 
of the kinds of social contexts that might make transformative dialogical engagement 
more likely. 
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Although Gerard Duveen died in late 2008, we have continued a dialogue with him 
throughout much of 2009. During his life, he was, for us, an exemplar of scholarly rigor and 
open-minded enquiry. Unsurprisingly, while we were with him at the Department of Social 
and Developmental Psychology in Cambridge, he influenced our thinking in numerous ways. 
Perhaps more surprising is that since his untimely death this influence has not only continued, 
but developed. It is the sign of a great contribution when that contribution grows and finds 
new relevancies when confronted with new problems. In the following discussion we 
articulate what it is that we have recently discovered in Gerard’s work, illustrate how it has 
influenced recent analyses that we have each been doing, and conclude by raising research 
questions which carry forward Gerard’s legacy.  
 
MICROGENESIS: THE MOTOR OF TRANSFORMATION  
 
Fundamental to our recent appreciation of Gerard’s work is a paradigmatic conceptualization 
of the intertwining of microgenetic, ontogenetic and sociogenetic processes (Duveen & 
Lloyd, 1990; Duveen & De Rosa, 1992). These processes are more than mere ‘levels’ of 
analysis in the social world, for they are conceptualized as genetic (i.e., processes of change 
which are constrained by the past) and intertwined. Specifically, Gerard taught us that 
microgenetic processes (actual interactions) are the engine driving change at ontogenetic 
levels (i.e., individual, psychological and identity change) and sociogenetic levels (i.e., 
changes in social representations and culture). “Microgenesis constitutes a motor,” he wrote 
with De Rosa, “for the genetic transformations of social representations” (Duveen & De Rosa, 
1993, p. 96).  
Gerard’s own patient and subtle empirical work demonstrates the phenomenon of 
microgenesis (Duveen, 2001). Boys and girls draw upon trans-situational representations of 
gender as resources in their interactions. In this process, ontogenetic development of their 
knowledge and identities can occur (Psaltis & Duveen, 2007). Equally, interactions are often 
conservative, and established knowledge and identities may be reinforced rather than 
changed. Moreover, enactments of representations within a microgenetic context can feed into 
trans-situational changes in the social representation of gender. However, although all 
sociogenetic change necessarily occurs through the motor of microgenesis, it does not follow 
that all microgenetic interaction leads to sociogenetic transformation. Representations and 
institutions can and do change, but they also tend towards stability and hegemony. In sum, the 
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“motor” of microgenesis draws into play sociogenetic and ontogenetic levels, reproducing 
them in more or less creative ways. 
In his eagerness to separate sociology from psychology, Durkheim (1898) created a 
gulf between psychological and sociological levels of analysis (Farr, 1996). The theory of 
social representations sought to bind together the psychological and the sociological 
(Moscovici, 1974/2008). But this is a difficult task, given that the majority of literature in 
sociology and psychology serves to reinforce this dualism. It is overly simplistic to try to 
explain the genesis and transformation of representations entirely at the sociological level 
(Durkheim, 1898). Equally, it is overly simplistic to try to explain collective representations 
entirely in terms of psychological processes (e.g., Sperber, 1996). Framing social 
representations in terms of microgenetic, sociogenetic and ontogenetic processes fulfils the 
ambition of binding together the psychological and sociological in creative, yet constrained, 
mutual transformation. 
 
IDENTITY: LINKING SOCIOGENESIS, ONTOGENESIS AND MICROGENESIS 
 
Gerard’s orientation to social processes was part of a paradigmatic re-conceptualization of the 
individual-social relation, with fellow travelers including Moscovici (1972), Farr (1996), 
Bauer and Gaskell (1999), Marková (2003), Howarth (2006) and Jovchelovitch (2007). 
Within this paradigmatic agenda, Gerard made his main contribution through his 
conceptualization of identity (Duveen & Lloyd, 1986). Identities are both personal and social, 
they are mediators of microgenetic processes and thus also both sociogenetic and ontogenetic 
processes. 
Gerard conceptualized identity as imperative in the sense that it is as much about 
being identified as making self-identifications (Duveen, 2001). He showed how identity is 
situated and relational. For example, in interactions between boys and girls, whether identity 
becomes salient or not depends on the gender marking of the task, which is one of the ways 
that widely-held representations mediate the situated microgenetic process (Lloyd & Duveen, 
1992). Cultural marking associates certain objects and tasks with certain identities, and as 
such enables some people to act in relation to those objects and tasks while disabling others. 
Gerard also made the insightful point that to change one’s beliefs within a situated interaction 
is also to change one’s identity positioning within that interaction (Leman & Duveen, 1999; 
Psaltis & Duveen, 2006). In conservation tasks, young girls will often conform to the 
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incorrect views of young boys and young boys will often dismiss the correct views of young 
girls because of pervasive representations of gender which bind the task to the boys' identities 
(Psaltis & Duveen, 2007). In this way, identity becomes a constraint not only upon what can 
be said and done within a relationship, but also upon the responses to what is said and done. 
 Recently, we have been particularly inspired by Gerard’s conception of identity as 
“the force or power that attaches a person or a group to an attitude or a belief” (2001, p. 268). 
Identity is thus the basis of resistance. “Resistance,” Gerard (2001, p. 269) wrote, “is the point 
where an identity refuses to accept what is proposed by a communicative act, that is, it refuses 
to accept an attempt at influence.” This conception of identity is particularly important when 
trying to understand processes of transformation at any level, because identity becomes a 
constraint upon what can be said on the one hand and accepted on the other. To quote Gerard 
again: “We can then consider identity as an asymmetry in a relationship that constrains what 
can be communicated through it – both in the sense of what it becomes possible to 
communicate and in the sense of what becomes incommunicable (and potentially a point of 
resistance), or communicable only on condition of a reworking of that identity” (2001, p.269). 
In the following two sections we articulate how this conceptualization of identity has recently 
helped us in two research projects, which, sadly, we never had a chance to discuss with 
Gerard himself. 
 
GIVING, RECEIVING AND RESISTING ADVICE 
 
The first research project concerns a case of professional advice-giving, as it occurs in 
conversations between Heath Visitors and their clients (McIntosh, Bryans, Cornish & Wallis, 
2008). Health Visitors are health professionals whose responsibilities include promoting the 
health and wellbeing of families with young children. They visit families at home, to engage 
them in discussions about the physical and psychosocial health of the children and parents. 
They deal with issues such as infant feeding and sleeping, child development, parents’ mental 
health, or smoking.  
Our research concerns the ‘engagement’ of each participant (the Health Visitor and the 
client) in the knowledge being presented by the other. For changes in health-related beliefs or 
actions to be taken up by the client, we presume, requires an engagement with the 
communication of the Health Visitor. For the Health Visitor to give ‘patient-centered care’, 
responding to the client’s particular world view, requires engagement with the client’s 
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knowledge. We wanted to observe, in the interaction, either or both parties being influenced 
by the words of the other, and then to theorize how this might happen. In order to explore this 
issue we obtained audio-recordings of the conversations between Health Visitors and clients 
during nine home visits, with follow-up interviews with both parties after each visit. 
At a basic level, we distinguish two kinds of interactions: a ‘non-conflictual’ 
interaction, where no differences surface and both parties appear to be in agreement, and a 
‘conflictual’ type of interaction, in which differences between the parties become evident 
(McIntosh et al., 2008). In one ‘non-conflictual’ interaction, for example, a Health Visitor 
shows a client a booklet about the recommended process for weaning an infant on to solid 
foods. The Health Visitor talks the client through the steps, showing the booklet, and the 
client responds in a positive, but vague way, ‘yes, yes, uh-huh, OK’.  
In 'conflictual' interactions, opposing views are voiced and stuck to. For example, in 
the course of one visit, in response to the father's racking cough, a Health Visitor initiated the 
topic of the parents' smoking and whether they would consider quitting. A long conversation 
ensued in which the parents used several tactics to resist the Health Visitor's suggestions. 
They first explained that they protect the child's health by only smoking out of the kitchen 
window with the door shut, but the Health Visitor was not satisfied, and pressed them further. 
The father explained that he had tried to quit but it was difficult, and the mother said she had 
tried nicotine patches, but was allergic to them – and that in any case, she does not smoke 
much. After trying several different tacks, the Health Visitor apparently gave up, and changed 
the topic to the less conflictual ground of the baby's teething. Neither side outwardly gave any 
sign of giving ground or adapting to the other's point of view. In other examples, we have also 
observed Health Visitors changing topics when a discussion appears not to progress, and 
clients re-defining their practices so that they sound more in line with the authorized advice. 
In other words, a variety of communicative processes are used to limit discussion of 
contentious issues. Drawing on Gerard’s ideas we argue that the identity relation is limiting 
what can be communicated in two ways. 
Firstly, comparing the content of conflictual and non-conflictual discussions reveals 
that discussions are more conflictual when advice is being given that contradicts the client's 
existing practice. Advice given 'preemptively' (e.g., before weaning has started) seems 
relatively unproblematic. From an identity frame of reference, we can interpret this to mean 
that to challenge a parent's current practices is to challenge their identity (including their 
identity as a 'good parent', and their identity as a competent adult of equal status to the Health 
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Visitor). For the Health Visitor to change her views would challenge her identity as a 
professional equipped with authorized expert knowledge. So, the interaction is not only an 
interaction over knowledge, but also an interaction over identities. Challenges to identities are 
likely to be resisted (Duveen, 2001).  
Secondly, both Health Visitor and client try to minimize conflicts, presumably 
because of the normative demand for a courteous discussion among adults. If there is a 
demand to avoid conflict, how can a conflict between authorized health professional advice 
and the client's current practice be resolved? Psaltis and Duveen’s (2006; 2007) extension of 
Moscovici’s (1980) theorization of social influence in terms of the dual processes of 
conversion and compliance may be useful here. As Psaltis and Duveen (2006, 2007) 
articulate, such a conflict can be resolved in two ways. Either it can be resolved on the 
cognitive plane, i.e. by one person changing their views so that both views match 
(conversion), or on the social plane, in a process of compliance, where one party publicly 
agrees with the other, but privately does not change. The changes of topic initiated by the 
Health Visitor, and the clients' re-description of their practices are ways of minimizing the 
conflict without either side having to engage with the other's views.  
Unlike in Gerard’s and his colleagues’ experiments with children, and the experiment 
reported below, where participants are forced to arrive at a single outcome, there is no such 
constraint compelling the Health Visitors to persist with a particular topic until an agreed 
conclusion is reached. Arguably the experimental convention produces more conformity than 
might occur in natural settings, where, as our research shows, even the hint of a stalemate can 
be enough to move the conversation on, to avoid conflict. 
Our research can only speculate about the longer-term impact of non-conflictual or 
conflictual interactions. While the non-conflictual interaction at face value seems to suggest 
alignment between the Health Visitor and client views, attending to social psychological 
processes of identity and influence (e.g. Duveen & Psaltis, 2008), we can see that, saying 'yes' 
can have various significances. Rather than indicating shared views, it may mean that the 
client knows how to participate appropriately in the 'receiving professional advice' 
communicative genre. In terms of influence, rather than being 'converted', saying 'yes' may 
indicate 'compliance'. It may be in the more 'conflictual' interactions that change is triggered. 
Even if change is not evident within the interaction itself, the client's engagement with the 
suggested changes, or the Health Visitor's engagement with the client's demands may take 
place between interactions. In theorizing the connection between identities and 
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representations, Duveen (2001) emphasized that to change one's beliefs (or actions) is also to 
change one's identity. This insight explains influence processes in our empirical setting. To 
capitulate visibly to the influence of another is to undermine one's current identity and 
position oneself as being 'corrected' by the input of the other – often an uncomfortable 
position to occupy. Perhaps a new communicative context would allow the parent discussed 
above to be the initiators of a discussion of potentially stopping smoking, 'owning' this topic 
as part of their own identity, and thus occupying an identity position in relation to the 
knowledge which allows more commitment to change.  
 
“NO, NO, NO, JUST SHUT UP AND LISTEN” 
 
The second research project we want to discuss is a series of experiments designed to test 
neo-Meadian ideas about perspective-taking (Gillespie, 2005; Martin, 2006). In contrast to 
cognitive approaches to perspective taking, we have argued that movement between social 
positions is an important social and interactional precursor to perspective-taking. Thus, for 
example, perspective-taking within routine activities such as giving a present are built upon 
people moving between the social positions of giving and receiving. Sometimes we give gifts 
and sometimes we receive them, and it is this institutionalized position exchange which 
provides the social basis for intersubjectivity within the activity of gift-giving. Similar 
examples could be provided for innumerable social routines, such as, talking/listening, 
winning/losing, ordering/obeying, buying/selling, etc. Thus, in short, we argue that before 
taking the perspective of the other in a cognitive sense, people usually have some experience 
of taking the social position of the other in an interactional sense. 
In order to challenge the cognitive interpretation of perspective taking, we (Gillespie 
& Richardson, under review) have run a series of experiments to test whether exchanging 
social positions within a joint task improves intersubjective coordination. The joint task we 
used is the Communication Conflict Situation (Blakar, 1973). In the task participants are 
given the social position of either Director or Follower. Directors are given a map with a route 
marked on it, and Followers are given a blank map. The Directors must verbally guide the 
Follower through the marked route. The participants are not allowed to look at each other’s 
maps. Usually dyads solve these map tasks quite efficiently. A conflict situation is introduced 
after a few basic trials. To create conflict the Director and Follower are given slightly 
discrepant maps (which they assume to be identical). Accordingly, the Director’s instructions 
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to the Follower fail. Solution to the conflict trial is defined as both participants agreeing that 
the maps are discrepant and presenting this fact to the experimenter. In other words the dyad 
needs to create perspective-transcending knowledge about the task. 
The experiment has two conditions. In the control condition participants are assigned 
the positions of Director and Follower at the outset, and they remain the same for all five 
trials. In the intervention condition social positions are also assigned at the outset, but are then 
exchanged after each trial. Thus in the second trial the former Director has the role of 
Follower, and in the third trial they exchange again, etc. The question was, would those dyads 
exchanging social position be better able to coordinate their perspectives and resolve the 
conflict task? 
The results of several experiments all indicate that exchanging social positions leads to 
a dramatic increase in solving the conflict trial. In our most recent experiment only 1/20 dyads 
in the control condition solved the task while 17/20 dyads who exchanged positions solved 
the task. Ostensibly these findings provide very convincing evidence for a social basis to 
perspective taking. However, a fine grained analysis of the conversations between the dyads 
reveals additional complexity which has made Gerard’s ideas on identity central to our 
interpretation. 
Analysis of the microgenetic conversations between Directors and Followers shows 
that no great feat of silently imagining the perspective of the other is necessary: each 
participant is telling the other clearly and repeatedly about their perspective. All that is needed 
to solve the task is that the participants listen to each other and accept at face value what the 
other is saying (e.g., “I don’t have a right turn there”). We need to understand why 
participants do not listen to each other and specifically how participants are able to dismiss 
what the other is saying. 
The task we have used constitutes two identities: Director and Follower. Although 
these identities are transient experimental identities, they do appear to be built upon 
representations of ‘directing’ and ‘following’ which in turn imbue these transient identities 
with socially prescribed and status-laden meanings. Directors speak more, issue more 
commands, ask fewer questions, are more likely to ignore utterances, and less likely to be 
ignored. In short, the Directors are in an identity position of communicative power vis-à-vis 
the Followers. This identity relation is a function of the way the participants construe the 
respective roles of “Director” and “Follower” by drawing upon representations of a 
leader/subordinate relationship. Understanding this relational identity is critical to 
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understanding how the dyads deal with the discrepant maps. All the dyads encounter the 
discrepancy, but they differ in how they deal with it. Three patterns of interaction are evident. 
First, there is a discrepancy avoidance pattern. The discrepancy invariably manifests 
first for the Follower (because they receive the impossible direction). In this pattern, the 
Follower chooses to gloss over the discrepancy, ignoring it, and taking a similar or arbitrary 
path through the map. The outcome is that the discrepancy is (temporarily) concealed. This 
course of action by the Follower prevents open conflict and avoids any manifestation of 
failure on the part of the Follower. However, it does not lead to a solution to the task. 
Accordingly, success in the task is subordinated to maintaining an amicable identity relation 
and avoiding possible blame. 
Second, there is what we call a blame pattern. This occurs when the Follower voices 
the discrepancy, saying that the Director’s direction is impossible (e.g., “but I don’t have a 
right turn there”). Voicing the discrepancy is usually followed by the Director either 
dismissing what the Follower has said (e.g., “no, there is a turning on your right”) or claiming 
that the Follower has made an error (e.g., “I can’t believe it, you have gone wrong again!”) or 
both (e.g., “no, no, no, just shut up and listen”). This pattern of blame sometimes escalates 
leading the Follower to blame the Director. 
Third, there is a pattern of engagement. This often follows a degree of communication 
conflict and blaming, and can be initiated by either party. In essence it entails each party 
trying to understand the point of view of the other. For example, the Director might say “OK, 
what else do you see on the right hand side?” or the Follower might offer to give directions to 
the Director to show the Director where they have gone. In each case this pattern is 
characterized by openness to the point of view of the other. The vast majority of this pattern 
of interaction occurs in the position exchange condition. 
Gerard’s work on identity can help us explain these results. In a manner akin to the 
young girls conforming to incorrect solutions and young boys dismissing correct solutions 
(Psaltis & Duveen, 2007), we have found that Followers often try to conform to impossible 
directions and Directors are very likely to dismiss correct observations which, if accepted, 
would enable solution of the task. Psaltis and Duveen (2007) explain their finding in terms of 
the social representations of gender and the gender marking of the task, and in a parallel 
manner, we can explain our finding in terms of the Director/Follower identity relation. 
Specifically, the social and cultural expectation is that information should flow from Director 
to Follower, but the solution of the task depends upon information flowing in the opposite 
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direction, and accordingly, the identity relation becomes an obstacle to the solution of the 
task. 
In the control condition the Director/Follower identity relation becomes entrenched by 
being repeated over five trials. When entrenched, it is easier for the Director to blame than to 
listen, and easier for the Follower to ignore the discrepancy than to engage in open conflict. 
Exchanging social positions, on the other hand, prevents the Director/Follower identity 
relation from becoming entrenched. In the position exchange condition, the Director was 
previously the Follower, and the Follower was previously the Director, and thus each has 
expertise in both social positions. Indeed, after alternating positions five times, the identity 
positions are both blurred and temporary. 
Analyzing the communicative dynamics within both conditions provided support for 
the role of identity in constraining what can be said and accepted. Using the procedure of 
Initiative-Response Analysis (Linell, Gustavsson & Juvonen, 1988), we found that in the 
position exchange condition, Followers were significantly more likely to be persistent in 
presenting their point of view and Directors were significantly more likely to ask questions 
and less likely to dismiss the Follower’s point of view. That is to say that the representations 
of the Director/Follower relation (i.e., the Director directing and the Follower following) were 
less entrenched in the position exchange condition. Thus our research is re-interpreted by 
taking on board Gerard’s (2001, p. 269) insight that: “We can then consider identity as an 
asymmetry in a relationship that constrains what can be communicated through it.” By 
manipulating social positions we were manipulating identity, and thus our strong results show 
the massive power of identity as a constraint. The entrenched and asymmetrical 
Director/Follower relation, produced in the control condition, constrained what not only what 
the subordinate identity (i.e., Followers) could say but also what the dominant identity (i.e., 
Directors) could hear and accept. The results was that the microgenetic dynamics of identity 
constrained the production of perspective-transcending knowledge about the task.  
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THE DIALOGUE CONTINUES  
 
If, as Gerard showed and we have also found, identity hierarchies constrain what can be said 
and heard, there are important consequences for the prospects for transformative and engaged 
dialogue between individuals or groups with different statuses. In our highly differentiated 
society, multiple hierarchies allow some speakers greater legitimacy to assert their views than 
others. It is of utmost importance to understand the ways in which asymmetries of identity 
status, often having an institutional and material basis, permit speaking and listening on the 
one hand, and self-silencing or dismissing on the other. In order to continue the dialogue with 
Gerard’s work, we want to raise two questions for future research. 
The first question is: what identities, in terms of content and representation, permit 
speaking out on the one hand and accepting or dismissing on the other hand? Are some 
individuals or groups bound into structurally weak identity positions, such that they are more 
likely to be ignored, blamed or dismissed? And if so, then what historical, cultural, social and 
institutional processes hold that asymmetry in place? In an extreme case one can think of 
people diagnosed with mental illness who have been compelled to undergo treatment without 
their consent. The representational field of mental illness represents people labeled with 
mental illness as not having a valid opinion, or point of view, and as such, their perspective is 
often dismissed before it is even engaged. The question to ask is what is peculiar to this 
identity content which enables this dismissing and silencing, and, where else do we find 
similar identity content at work? Alternatively, how do people labeled with mental illness 
construct identities which authorize them to speak out and insist on being heard? 
The second question is: what contexts of interaction encourage listening and speaking 
versus dismissing and conforming? On the 20th November 1989 Nicolae Ceauşescu, President 
of Romania, gave a six-hour speech and received sixty-seven standing ovations. He had 
created a relational identity between him and the government which consisted of speaking 
without listening. Clearly he had created a context, backed up by force, in which dialogue was 
impossible. One month later his regime was overthrown and he was executed. We need to 
understand and produce relational contexts, and the associated identity positions, which 
enable transformative dialogue – by which we mean interaction in which both parties are open 
to the perspective of the other and not resistant to being changed by that perspective.  
Gerard, through his research, revealed that hierarchical identity relations, or, in his 
Piagetian terminology, ‘relations of constraint,’ can make the gap between speaking and being 
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heard almost unbridgeable. This insight, however, was not confined to his scholarly 
contributions. Through his inter-personal interactions he revealed how the large identity gap 
between the student and the Cambridge academic could be overcome. He respected other 
people’s points of view, questioned them on their ideas and sought to engage with the 
particularities of alterity. He always heard what was being said. Visiting him in his room at 
Corpus Christi college invariably involved a double espresso, a comfortable environment, and 
an unrushed feeling. In short, he succeeded in creating an identity relation within which open 
debate and discussion was not only possible but expected. 
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